New Delhi: The Supreme Court Friday held there was no procedural infirmity in the constitution of an inquiry panel by the Lok Sabha Speaker to look into the alleged discovery of unaccounted cash from Allahabad High Court judge Justice Yashwant Varma’s official residence.
A bench of Justices Dipankar Dutta and S.C.Sharma dismissed Justice Varma’s petition that challenged the constitution of the three-member committee as part of the impeachment proceedings moved against the judge.
The bench said the Speaker committed “no illegality in constituting the committee”, and held that Justice Varma “is not entitled to any relief” and “no interference” by the court “is called for.”
The key contention of Justice Varma was that the Lok Sabha Speaker had proceeded to form the committee without awaiting the Rajya Sabha chairman’s decision on the admission of a motion that was moved in the Upper House of Parliament.
Justice Varma said since the Rajya Sabha Chairman, a position held by the Deputy Chairman then, had dismissed the motion there, the Lok Sabha Speaker was barred from constituting the panel. This was in view of Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, which mandates a joint probe panel if the impeachment motion is moved in the two Houses on the same day.
Since it was done in his case, Justice Varma argued that the Lok Sabha Speaker could not have unilaterally constituted the panel. Besides, he contended that the Rajya Sabha Chairman had dismissed the impeachment motion moved before him. In such a scenario, Justice Varma argued, the Lok Sabha Speaker could not have entertained the motion in the Lower House.
At the outset, the bench dismissed Justice Varma’s interpretation of Section 3(2) of the 1968 Act. It said the joint committee, under the provision, is mandated only when notices of motion given in both Houses, on the same day, have been admitted.
The provision, in its present form, was silent of a situation witnessed in the present case. In case, a law has gaps, then the Constitution and doctrine of silence must be read into the statute to fill this vacuum.
“The Constitution is the supreme and overarching legal framework, to which all statutes must conform,” the bench said.
If Justice Varma’s argument is accepted, then it would produce absurd results and disable the Lok Sabha Speaker from proceeding, the court added.
To interpret” it “in the manner suggested…would require us to read into it a disabling consequence, namely, that the motion pending in the other House must also necessarily fail. Such an interpretation would amount to judicial legislation, a course we are neither empowered nor inclined to undertake,” the bench said.
The proviso cannot be read in a way that it nullifies the provision, it added.
“There is nothing in the Inquiry Act to suggest that rejection of a motion in one House would render the other House incompetent to proceed in accordance with law.”
Justice Varma’s interpretation would make the law open to abuse, the bench said.
“It would permit a situation where, upon getting the wind of a notice of motion being given for removal of a judge with a real likelihood of the same being admitted by the Presiding Officer of one House, certain members of the other House not inclined to have the process of removal initiated against the judge may deliberately give a defective notice on the same day, solely with the intention of scuttling the proceedings,” it said.
Justice Varma’s second ground of challenge was also dismissed as legally untenable.
According to him, the motion was rejected by the Deputy Chairman who held the post following the resignation of RS Chairman Jagdeep Dhankhar. He said in the absence of the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman could not have rejected it.
The bench did a holistic reading of Article 91 of the Constitution and the 1968 Act to hold “the duties that the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman (in case of a vacancy in the former office) perform under the Inquiry Act cannot be separated from the office that they hold as the Presiding Officer of the House.”
The above-mentioned Article outlines the powers of the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha to act as Chairman when the Chairman is absent or the office is vacant for ensuring the House’s functioning.
The top court, however, agreed with Justice Varma’s argument that the RS Deputy Chairman’s decision declining to admit the motion was drawn up by the House Secretary General, which was not “in order.”
It opined that the Secretary General was expected to remain confined to “administrative scrutiny, such as verification of procedural compliance, and could not extend to assuming a quasi-adjudicatory function.” The 1968 Act, it said, does not contemplate a substantive assessment of the merits of the allegations by the Secretariat of a House.
However, the bench said, this argument was an academic exercise and shall not, directly, or indirectly, be relied upon or invoked by Justice Varma to claim any benefit, leverage or advantage.
This kind of procedural irregularity, it added, cannot “retrospectively invalidate a lawful exercise of power already undertaken by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, which was founded on an admitted motion.”
(Edited by Tony Rai)