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For nearly a decade, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates appeared inseparable. They coordinated foreign policy, pooled military power, aligned on regional disputes, and projected a shared vision of Gulf stability. From the Yemen war to the boycott of Qatar, the two states were often described as twin anchors of the Arab world’s post-Arab Spring order.
That era is ending.
What was once a discreet divergence has now hardened into a visible schism, played out across Yemen, economic policy, diplomacy, and even public messaging. The rupture did not arrive overnight, but its sudden visibility has surprised many observers. The deeper truth is more unsettling: Saudi Arabia and the UAE are no longer merely adjusting tactics; they are pursuing fundamentally different visions of regional power.
From Strategic Alignment to Quiet Competition
The Saudi–UAE partnership was always more pragmatic than sentimental. It rested on overlapping threat perceptions, political Islam, Iranian influence, regional instability, rather than ideological convergence. When those threats appeared acute, coordination was easy. But alliances built on threat alignment tend to fray once priorities shift.
The first cracks emerged in Yemen, the war that initially symbolised Gulf unity. While Riyadh viewed Yemen primarily as a border-security problem requiring a unified state under a friendly government, Abu Dhabi treated it as a laboratory for influence, backing militias, securing ports, and cultivating local proxies aligned with its maritime and commercial interests.
By 2019, the divergence was unmistakable. The UAE reduced its direct military footprint, while continuing to support southern separatist forces, a move that undercut Saudi efforts to preserve Yemen’s territorial integrity. What Riyadh saw as destabilising fragmentation, Abu Dhabi saw as strategic optionality.
Yemen was not the cause of the rift; it was the accelerant.
The Moment the Disagreement Went Public
The transformation from quiet divergence to open friction became undeniable when Saudi-led coalition strikes targeted areas linked to UAE-backed actors in southern Yemen. Shortly thereafter, Abu Dhabi announced the withdrawal of its remaining forces, drawing a clear line between its priorities and Riyadh’s.
More striking than the military developments was the change in tone. Saudi and Emirati media, traditionally disciplined and restrained when discussing each other, began carrying pointed commentary. Business signals followed. Emirati firms pulled out of Saudi defence exhibitions. Economic coordination once taken for granted became conditional.
In Gulf politics, public disagreement is rarely accidental. When differences surface openly, it is usually because private mechanisms have failed.
Competing Models of Power
At the heart of the Saudi–UAE split lies a clash of governing philosophies.
Saudi Arabia remains wedded to a state-centric model of regional order. Its strategy emphasises sovereignty, hierarchy, and long-term stability, even at the cost of speed or flexibility. This logic also underpins Riyadh’s approach to energy markets, regional diplomacy, and internal reform under Vision 2030.
The UAE, by contrast, has embraced a networked power model. It is comfortable working through non-state actors, commercial leverage, and modular alliances. From the Horn of Africa to the eastern Mediterranean, Abu Dhabi has demonstrated a preference for influence without entanglement, presence without responsibility.
These approaches are not easily reconciled. Where Saudi Arabia sees fragmentation, the UAE sees diversification. Where Riyadh prioritises control, Abu Dhabi prioritises access.
External Alignments Pull Them Apart
The geopolitical environment has also changed. US policy in the Middle East is increasingly transactional and episodic. China’s economic footprint is expanding. Israel has entered the regional equation through normalisation agreements, a development the UAE has embraced far more openly than Saudi Arabia. As external anchors weaken, regional powers are improvising. But improvisation does not always move in the same direction.
Saudi Arabia’s cautious recalibration contrasts with the UAE’s appetite for early positioning. Over time, this has transformed coordination into competition, not hostile, but unmistakable.
Where the Relationship Stands Now
Despite the rhetoric and symbolism, this is not a complete rupture. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain economically intertwined, culturally linked, and strategically aware of the costs of outright confrontation. What has emerged instead is a managed rivalry, cooperation where necessary, competition where unavoidable.
Yet even a managed rivalry has consequences. A divided Gulf weakens collective leverage at a moment of global energy uncertainty. It complicates conflict resolution in Yemen and the Red Sea corridor. And it signals to smaller regional actors that Gulf unity, long treated as a given, is now conditional.
The Saudi–UAE schism is not a passing disagreement. It reflects a deeper question confronting the Middle East: whether regional order will be shaped by states, or by networks. The answer is still unfolding. But one thing is clear, the era of automatic Saudi–Emirati alignment is over, and the region will feel its absence.
These pieces are being published as they have been received – they have not been edited/fact-checked by ThePrint.