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Indigenous Aero-engines for fighter aircraft:
A typical engine for Tejas fighter aircraft from GE would cost about 5 Million Dollars. Spending a Whopping Seven Billion Dollars for a ToT from abroad for an engine is foolhardy, for the future AMCA aircraft. It is almost an amount equivalent to buying anywhere upward of thousand to fourteen hundred engines, out right. Such a phenomenal cost can’t be justified by any economic model. Just to appreciate the huge cost, be aware that it is equivalent to the cost of 99 Tejas Mk-1A, IAF has recently placed on HAL, at a cost of about Sixty thousand Crores.
I had the opportunity to work on aero-engine design ( PTAE-7) for a decade, before moving over to LCA design. I can without hesitation state that designing a 4+ generation Fighter aircraft (Tejas) from scratch is an order more difficult than an aero-engine. If engine a System, LCA a System of Systems. Just the challenges the LCA program has to address developing either a Qudraplex Digital Fly by Wire Control System Or the Carbon Fiber Composite Technology from scratch, outweigh an engine development. The difference between success and failure of the programs can be attributed to the project management styles of the concerned programs. In the case of ADA, it had a mighty industrial partner HAL, as the main work center and ADA having a transparent project management & review system open for continuous criticism. ADA was ready to approach anyone in the country or abroad, where there is a potential found to develop the requisite technology or a system. Imagine, a CSIR lab developing entire Carbon Fiber Composite Technology from scratch with funding from ADA and finally crossing the international bench marks in Co-cured & Co-bonded Composite Technologies. Similarly, take the case of a professor from High Voltage Department of IISc, establishing a full-fledged Lightning Test Facility at CABS, generating Million Volt discharges required for testing the Composite structures, for their ability to withstand lightning strike during flights. Participation of Labs from CSIR & DRDO, various academic institutions, public & private sector industries etc to the tune of about hundred plus work centers, all over India, made the difference. Today, not only the aircraft is developed, but the entire ecosystem, for future fighter aircraft development. Such an approach was not in place in the Kaveri engine development program and it was limited by the wisdom available at the lab to a large extent. Hence, failure to develop the engine should be attributed to the approach, rather than convert it to an unsurmountable super-duper technology, for the country to develop. Since any ToT from abroad won’t be hundred percent and also that there is no guarantee that those who are part of the ToT will remain with the establishment to develop another engine in distant future, it is better to use the same corpus of Seven Billion Dollars envisaged spending, more pragmatically.
Be aware that whether it is Tejas Mk1A, Mk2 or AMCA, the IAF will not need more than two to three hundred aircraft in a given category. Even with a collaborative ToT, a new engine is unlikely to be available in the next five years. Hence, it can only be targeted for future AMCA, not for Tejas varients. For Tejas Mk1, the existing contract for GE404 engines would do and for Mk2, HAL is negotiating a licensed production of GE414. Any dislocation by USA, due to geopolitics, will have to be addressed by other available alternatives, involving a lot of issues including integration of any new engine with Tejas airframe & systems, which will not be a quick fix. Only time will tell whether such a replacement would be from Russia or France, depending on the geopolitics. Given that, certainly the engine planned to be developed through ToT is not a solution for any immediate crisis, related to Tejas needs. Since AMCA is a new platform, it will take more than a decade to get into any production line. The initial development and production batches are planned to be with GE414. Hence, the hue and cry for our own engine doesn’t mean that we have to necessarily spend a whopping Seven Billion Dollars for ToT. Instead, we promote both, the GTRE on further development of Kaveri engine and a Private Consortium for an abinitio development of an AMCA in parallel. Also, on the development of critical technologies and test infrastructure required for engine development, with much lesser total cost. A part of the resulting savings can also be spent on licensed production of more than one engine, required immediately for Tejas variants, as elaborated in the following:
- Continue to fund existing Kaveri project, till its eventual success:
The recent remarks of GTRE director are positive, about the technology they have established so far. And it is a good move to delink the Kaveri engine from LCA requirements and target it for other defense requirements, when it succeeds. However, GTRE must open up itself, for active participation of other institutions in the country, including Engine Design Bureau of HAL and the private sector. It can adopt a more open model like the one in LCA project, to harness the capabilities across the country. Continued support to Kaveri at best can cost an additional Ten thousand Crores.
2. Go for licensed production of Two alternative engines, including the GE414:
Each ToT cost for licensed production can be about a Billion dollars. Since we now have additional production line from Nasik, it can adopt the new engine, permitting exports of LCA to countries which are not approved by USA, for GE414.
3. A Private Venture with a liberal R&D grant for AMCA, as suggested in the following:
I am totally in agreement with Shri Baba Kalyani’s statement elsewhere that we as a country has the requisite capability to develop a fighter engine. And any fresh initiative has to be with private sector taking the responsibility towards delivery. I am also in agreement with someone in the private sector suggesting in another forum that the project may require Twelve Thousand Crores of investment. Hence, let us have a Private Consortium with 51% private equity and the rest of 49% by DRDO. Let the consortium have an equity of Rs.4000 Cr and get an R&D grant of Rs. 8000Cr, making up to the total of Rs. 12,000 Crore. As a condition, the grant should be spent in proportion to equity, to ensure responsible spending. The consortium when successful will have the ownership of IPR and can charge an agreed license fees, on the future production of engines by a separate entity. The development entity would continue as an engine development agency and develop further technologies and future engines. To sum up, the private partners will have to bring in just 2000 Cr towards 51% equity and rest of 10,000 Cr by government towards 49% equity and R&D grant.
4. Development of critical technologies specific to engine requirements:
- Single Crystal Blade: Often the development of single crystal Blades, with cooling holes is highlighted as a critical technology. But, people forget that no engine development enterprise abroad, whether Safran Or Rolls Royce Or GE, develop such technologies in house. They would get them developed in some metallurgical establishment, with required technology base. DMRL is a very capable lab of DRDO and can be assigned the responsibility of developing the single crystal blades, to the required standards, if required with some consultancy from abroad.
- Creep, Fatigue & Facture Allowables: Similarly, NAL can easily help on fatigue, fracture and Creep allowables, given it’s stellar background in these areas.
3. Structural Optimization for Minimum Weight: We do have state of the art capabilities in Analysis and Optimization. We just need to pull together the expertise available at ADA & NAL. Hence, controlling weight should not be an unsurmountable issue. If required, I can be approached for advice, on how to go about. I can be reached on my email: shamskonda@yahoo.co.in
4. Flying Test Bed: is also shown as a missing capability. Engine Design Bureau of HAL, which has mastered the development of engine test beds, can be assigned with the responsibility.
All such specific R&D activities can be managed separately by DRDO, in consultation with GTRE and the new private consortium. ADA can assist the DRDO, for routing the funds and organizing/supervising the development reviews.
All these technology developments should be a matter of a thousand or two thousand crores, at best.
To Sum Up: Not only the total money spent on all these initiatives will be less than the Seven Billion Dollars, for the proposed ToT through a foreign collaboration, these initiatives offer more than one route for success. They will not only ensure the availability of engines for immediate needs, but will establish the required echo-system for aero-engine development in the country.
My background: My Doctorate from England in 1981 was on Structural Analysis of Rotating Structures. Immediately on return from UK, I had the opportunity to optimize the rotors and casings of PTAE-7 engine, prior to moving over to ADA. I worked on LCA project at ADA and was the Project Director (Air Frame), responsible for the entire structure. I also handled dozens of international contracts for LCA, as Director (Contracts). Hence, I assume I am equipped enough to make the above remarks and suggestions.
Dr K Sham Sunder
Outstanding Scientist & a former Project Director, ADA
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