That Dangerous Feeling

It is fascinating how all the conversation around the new government’s agenda, even the 100-day plans being drawn up by its various ministries, is mainly focused on the economy, infrastructure, physical and human and what are described as social sector schemes. The near-total absence of the word security from these discussions is both reassuring and worrying. Reassuring, because it underlines the fact that despite occasional terrorist attacks, we Indians now feel more secure than at any time in the past. There is no active hostility on any of our borders; with the one terrible exception of Gujarat in 2002, we have not seen a communal riot of any notable size since December 1992; and the Naxalite threat in east-central tribal districts apart, there is no real, active insurgency. It is also worrying because this sweet-spot feeling can make us complacent, as it possibly did in the first four years of UPA-I. The internal security machinery went to sleep then, and even defence just ambled along, postponing acquisition, returning modernisation budgets unspent, and generally hunting for evidence to nail the previous government on its import deals.

UPA-I was shocked out of that complacency by 26/11. There was a quick and unpleasant realisation that India had slipped in both its conventional deterrence capability vis-à-vis Pakistan and its internal security, and the paramilitary forces and intelligence agencies were physically and logistically run down and low on morale. And while this led to some quick action and damage control, with the appointment of an active home minister and the defence ministry springing into action, there is a danger now that security could slip back in our priorities, particularly if we are gifted a few more months of peace and calm. Several facts would caution us against such premature smugness.

India’s external environment has worsened greatly in the past 12 months and there is nothing to indicate a turnaround. Pakistan’s current preoccupation with internal terrorism and the Taliban may give us more temporary respite. But it is a mixed bag. As Hafiz Saeed’s release shows, the Pakistanis are quite emphatic in making a distinction between terror groups that threaten them and their American allies, and the Lashkars that their army and ISI patronise as strategic assets against India. At the same time, it is giving them an opportunity to indulge in some squeeze-play with the Americans. In return for the war on the Taliban, they are squeezing not just cash and military aid from Washington, they are also getting away with their totally cynical but time-tested policy of nuancing terror groups as being different on their western and eastern flanks. Therefore many in the Indian security establishment believe that another terror attack may not be entirely improbable if for nothing else than to keep us unbalanced and the Americans interested.

Nepal has deteriorated greatly, and as things stand we seem short of ideas as well as leverage there. More than any other neighbour, an unstable Nepal is a threat that is both internal and external, given our shared demography and the nature of our borders. Links between the Nepalese Maoists and India’s Naxals are still rather incipient, probably because our border districts in UP and Bihar have still resisted the red story. But it is precisely because of that possibility that the current lack of a political centre of gravity in Nepal is a grave evolving threat to us. The real threat there is not so much the growing Chinese influence, but the prospect of anarchy.

Bangladesh looks quieter now, but its newly elected and very popular government has just survived a grave situation arising from a paramilitary mutiny, one which nearly led to a takeover by an army brass furious at the brutal massacre of nearly a hundred of its officers and many families. Sheikh Hasina’s election represents the arrival of a rare Bangladesh government not hostile to India. Any threat to its existence, therefore, is greatly detrimental to our interests as well, particularly when it has begun to crack down on ULFA and its backers. Are we prepared and focused on that situation? Do we have the leverage and wherewithal? Any deterioration there will have dangerous consequences for us, particularly when our own Bengal may be headed for two difficult years with Mamata challenging the Marxists in the streets and the countryside.

Even Sri Lanka, despite its victory against the LTTE, is likely to go through testing times, paying the huge economic cost of the war and facing the possibility of the political ambitions of a hero-worshipped army high on victory and Sinhala nationalism.

Our overall security picture, therefore, leaves no scope for complacency. UPA-II has made a good beginning by squashing at least the small but very vicious DHD (Jewel Group) in Assam’s North Cachar Hills. An all-out and decisive assault on armed Maoists, involving five state governments and the Centre, cannot be postponed any longer.

India can’t get anywhere if its entire mineral heartland is being held to ransom by private militias that massacre policemen and collect taxes. At the same time our defence, particularly conventional, must get renewed focus and increased resources.

Internal security and strategic issues of such serious complexity do not exactly fit in with 100-day agendas. But you can at least make a new beginning in your approach and thinking. In my book, therefore, a good 100-day agenda would include:

• An all-out assault on Maoist militias.
• The launch of a two-year plan to revamp intelligence and re-energise Central paramilitary forces.
• A commitment to not let scandal-mongering block defence acquisitions. Two good examples are the Barak missile and Denel gun, both now blocked in our post-Bofors scam-phobia.
• An increase in defence budgets, going up from 2.35 per cent currently to at least 3 per cent of GDP over a three-year period.
• Finally, a commitment to spend the money budgeted.

Surely all this does not fit in with the talk of economic stimulus and inclusive growth. But unless we invest the time, emotion, intellect and money that our security deserves, all economic gains will be transient and have no meaning.