In the world of geopolitics, prestige often follows precision. After the Pokhran Nuclear test in 1998, the world started acknowledging, rather grudgingly, India as a rising regional power. But our image in the global defence arena was paradoxical; we were seen as a rising power with declining self-reliance, an arms importer negotiating from a position of dependence. From 2014, things started changing slowly but steadily, and the data started telling a new story. From being the largest arms importer globally just a decade ago, India has now emerged as one of the fastest-growing defence exporters. This transition is not a statistical quirk – it is the outcome of a deliberate statecraft of industrial policy, procurement reform, and strategic autonomy that has quietly redefined the country’s role in the global military-industrial complex.
In 2020-21, India’s defence exports stood at Rs 8,434 crore. Four years later, in 2024–25, they reached an all-time high of Rs 23,622 crore (roughly $2.8 billion). For context, that’s a nearly threefold increase in four years and a thirty-four-fold jump from the Rs 686 crore exported in 2013-14. This is not only a numerical feat but a structural one: India now exports defence products to over 80 countries, including radar systems, artillery guns, missiles, offshore patrol vessels, bulletproof jackets, and electronic warfare equipment. More than the quantity, it’s the direction of movement that matters, i.e. from dependence to contribution.
Crucially, this is not a success owned by the public sector alone. In 2024–25, around Rs 15,233 crore worth of exports were from private sector companies, while public sector undertakings (PSUs) contributed Rs 8,389 crore. This is the clearest signal, yet, about the government’s long-standing ambition to build a dual-track defence manufacturing ecosystem; one where PSUs scale up, but private industry too innovate and compete.
India’s rising defence exports
What explains this surge? The answer lies in a combination of very strong political intent, institutional reform, and market signalling. The Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy (DPEPP), released in 2020, laid out ambitious targets to become “Atmanirbhar”. While such policies often fade into paper, DPEPP has had a measurable effect; it is not only setting benchmarks but reorganising the procedural architecture. For instance, the introduction of the Open General Export Licence (OGEL) drastically reduced the red tape that previously discouraged Indian firms from bidding internationally. Similarly, the role of defence attachés was redefined – as not ceremonial observers but facilitators of Indian defence sales.
Parallelly, reforms were introduced in procurement policies. Over 75 per cent of India’s capital defence procurement budget is now earmarked for domestic manufacturers. This move has created demand stability, enabling firms to build economies of scale. Moreover, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) limits in the defence sector were raised to 74 per cent through the automatic route, sending a clear signal – India was no longer just a buyer’s market, it was open to co-development, co-production, and eventually, co-exports.
These reforms were not confined to policy documents. The government undertook one of the most significant defence-sector structural overhauls in decades by corporatising the Ordnance Factory Board. In place of a monolithic bureaucracy now stand seven PSUs, each with defined business verticals, from ammunition and explosives to armoured vehicles and weapons platforms. This not only brought accountability and professional management into the system but also allowed these companies to function with the autonomy required in a competitive global market.
Other PSUs were not left untouched. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)’s helicopter manufacturing facility in Tumakuru has drastically increased its production capacity. Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) has expanded its research and development footprint and diversified into cutting-edge sectors like AI-enabled defence electronics, while Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), India’s missile production specialist, has begun pursuing export orders independently. These changes mark a significant departure from the era when PSUs were viewed as stagnant, slow, and globally uncompetitive.
Equally, the private sector’s role has been nurtured with a mix of strategic handholding and competitive opportunity. The Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) programme, which is designed to fund startups and Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) with grants to develop niche defence technologies, has led to over 430 contracts being signed as of 2025. This has allowed non-traditional actors to enter a previously closed-off ecosystem and accelerated innovation in critical domains such as munitions, anti-drone systems, and next-generation protective gear.
The Government of India has also established two Defence Industrial Corridors (DICs) in the country; one in the State of Uttar Pradesh and the other in Tamil Nadu. These corridors, backed by state and central incentives, have turned previously under-utilised regions into growing defence manufacturing clusters.
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Role of Operation Sindoor
And now, what turned these policies into global visibility, however, was a moment of operational clarity—our “Operation Sindoor”. This operation became India’s first major military engagement that leaned heavily on indigenous systems across the spectrum. Akash surface-to-air missiles intercepted enemy drones; electronic warfare systems developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) disrupted hostile radar; Indian-built loitering munitions executed precision strikes without endangering the pilots. Even the real-time battlefield imagery was piped through flight data and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO)’s satellite network, integrated with the military’s command-and-control backbone.
Not a single foreign-made system had to be sourced at the last minute. For the military, this operation marked a moment of doctrinal confidence; the kit they had trained on, tested, and deployed had been made in India, and it worked. For policymakers, it was a vindication. For foreign observers, it was a case study.
In defence diplomacy, performance under fire is the gold standard. After Operation Sindoor, countries that had hesitated to sign large contracts with Indian suppliers began re-engaging. The Philippines had already signed a $375 million deal for the BrahMos supersonic missile in 2022. Now, follow-up orders are reportedly being negotiated. Armenia, having procured the Pinaka rocket launcher system, is exploring new artillery systems.
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Defence exports – extensions of statecraft
India’s rise as a defence exporter also intersects with larger strategic questions. In a world increasingly fractured along technology and arms supply lines, from the United States-China split to sanctions on Russia, countries are looking for defence partners who are neutral, reliable, and geopolitically nimble. India fits that profile. Its exports come without political strings, ideological baggage, or export control regimes designed to impose conditionalities. This makes us an attractive alternative, especially for countries in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.
The result is that Indian defence exports now serve a dual function, not only as economic and industrial gain, but as strategic levers of soft power. A country that buys your radars will want your training. A navy that sails your patrol boats will engage with your doctrine. A military that integrates your missiles will also align with your threat perceptions. In short, defence exports become quiet extensions of statecraft.
To be sure, challenges remain. India still relies on imports for certain subsystems: high-performance engines, some types of sensors, advanced electronic warfare modules, and semiconductor components. But these gaps are narrowing. A second wave of reform, which is focused on incentivising high-end R&D, de-risking capital investment in core technologies, and attracting diaspora scientists, is already underway. The Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme (DTIS) and the growth of dual-use tech incubators are promising steps.
What makes the present moment unique is not just the numbers or even the technology, but the institutional confidence that has been built over time. Defence exports were once seen as exceptions. Today, they are part of annual planning cycles. Startups now pitch to the Army in structured innovation challenges. PSUs participate in global tenders. Export authorisations are routine, not rare. This normalisation of ambition is perhaps the most important shift of all.
Looking ahead, as India approaches its centenary of Independence, it stands at the cusp of being recognised not just as a defence buyer or manufacturer but as a serious defence power, capable of shaping regional security outcomes through industry, innovation, and initiative.
Atmanirbharta or ‘Make in India’ in the defence sector is no longer a promise. It is a process and increasingly, a product. And in 2025, that product is being shipped across oceans, tracked by radar, tested in conflict, and trusted by allies. That is not just manufacturing policy – it is national transformation in real-time.
Sujeet Kumar is a Rajya Sabha MP from Odisha and a practising advocate. Views are personal and do not represent those of his political party or any other organisation he is associated with.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)