New Delhi: “Unprecedented” is the adjective used in almost every global newspaper’s description of Iran’s retaliatory attack against Israel on 14 April, which the Benjamin Netanyahu government responded militarily by firing missiles at an Iranian airbase in Isfahan Friday morning.
Iran’s counter-attack last week wasn’t exactly unpredictable—Tehran made it pretty clear it would respond to a suspected Israeli attack on its consulate in Syria on 1 April that killed two of its senior military commanders. It named its operation “True Promise”, reflecting its vow to punish those who attacked its diplomatic mission.
But the barrage of Iranian drones and missiles—approximately 300—had no precedent. Neither did the suspected Israeli strike near an Iranian military base that followed. It was the first time, after 45 years of an icy shadow war, that we saw a direct confrontation between the regional archenemies. And that is why the new arc of violence in the Israel-Iran conflict, now marked by direct confrontation, is ThePrint’s Newsmaker of the Week.
Some view Iran as dealing the first hand or lighting the first match. But certain analysts suggest Tehran’s calculation involved not just sending a message to Israel but also to its own proxies in the region.
Sanam Vakil, Director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the Chatham House think tank, told The Guardian: “Iran’s calculation was that if [it] didn’t respond, Israel will keep trying to push back and degrade the axis of resistance across the region. This was about reinforcing its red lines and some measure of deterrence.”
For five days, the world waited with bated breath for Israel’s response. The German and British foreign ministers flew into Israel earlier this week in efforts to prevent an escalation of the conflict, but it was clear that Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu was going to strike back. It was just a matter of when and how.
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Diversion from traditional strategies
By launching direct attacks on each other’s soil after decades of covert operations, cyber attacks and proxy wars, Israel and Iran have diverted from long-standing foreign policy strategies.
On the one hand, Iran had always followed a policy of “strategic patience”, which involves propping up proxy forces in the Middle East to fight off Israel and its Western allies, while also projecting power in the region. Hezbollah in Lebanon is a prime example of this. In 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon to expel the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) sent in what was known as the “Prophet Mohammad Corps” to Syria, which was then sent to Lebanon to fight against Israeli forces. This was the birth of Hezbollah.
“The Islamic Republic is a survivalist regime,” explains Arman Mahmoudian, a lecturer of Russian and Middle Eastern Studies and a PhD candidate in politics and international affairs at the University of South Florida, in an article for Gulf International Forum.
“Hezbollah’s foundational purpose raises the question: why has the militant group thus far avoided confrontation? The brief answer is that Hezbollah is too valuable an asset to be deployed recklessly,” he adds.
By launching 300 drones and missiles into Israel, Tehran effectively abandoned this policy and any previous reluctance it had in attacking Israel directly.
Similarly, Israel seems to have diverted from its “reverse periphery doctrine”. Previously, under Israel’s first prime minister David Ben-Gurion, Israel followed the “periphery doctrine” in a bid to end its isolation in the Middle East. The idea was to pursue relations with non-Arab states at the ‘edges’ of the Middle East, mainly Iran and Turkey.
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‘Muted’ responses
With Iran and Israel diverting from their traditional strategies, the big question is whether an all-out war is on the horizon and whether it’s one that could drag in Israel’s ally, the US. For now, those fears seem to be abating for two reasons.
First, Israel and Iran’s responses following the tit-for-tat attacks, which some newspapers have described as “muted”. Second, the relatively small scale of Israel’s attack on Friday morning, which seems to have given some analysts hope that the policy of conventional deterrence has returned.
A report by Reuters noted the absence of an official comment from the Israeli leadership on Friday’s strike, while Iranian television reports “played down the attack” by not opting for the common term used to describe Israel—“Zionist entity”.
The Iranian state media also seems to have downplayed sounds of an explosion in Tabriz near an area called Vadi-e-Rahmat, which the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) said is currently in a “peaceful situation”.
Further, no fatalities were recorded after Iran’s attack on Sunday and Israel’s attack on Friday and most importantly, no nuclear sites in either country were targeted. Experts like American political scientist and author Ian Bremmer have gone as far as to say that Israel’s strike was “deescalatory”.
israeli strike against iran is deescalatory.
had to take some sort of action.
restrained compared to attacks on damascus that precipitated the crisis.
— ian bremmer (@ianbremmer) April 19, 2024
Could it be that Netanyahu’s war cabinet eventually opted for a relatively smaller attack than Iran’s barrage of 300 drones and missiles because the Joe Biden administration said it wouldn’t be involved in any retaliation on behalf of Israel? Or perhaps the small scale was considered enough to satisfy the domestic audience while preserving some diplomatic support that Israel regained after months of international criticism for its actions in Gaza?
Either way, Iran doesn’t appear keen to respond. A senior Iranian official told Reuters there were no plans to retaliate against Israel for its Friday attack.
Does that mean things have returned to status quo ante? The short answer is ‘No’. Both Israel and Iran will have to rethink their respective policies of “strategic patience” and “reverse periphery doctrine”. A new ground has been set and many levers remain in play — the situation in the Red Sea with Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas in Gaza, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Any movement on these levers could jeopardise this perceived reprieve.
(Edited by Prashant)