Trump’s first 100 days in office have played out like a high-octane spectacle, rife with chaos and contradictions. A tariff war, meant to flex the economic muscle, has so far adversely impacted America’s own interests. With its rushed, half-baked ceasefires, this administration has been more committed to applauding its president than crafting a coherent strategy for anything. It is high on swagger and shock, low on substance.
In this whirlwind and the political fallout of ‘Signalgate’—the security scandal that led to the high-profile ousting of National Security Advisor Mike Waltz—the minerals deal with Ukraine had been forgotten.
The last 48 hours, though, have turned its fate.
The deal’s first outing had ended in disaster, marked by the Oval Office altercation between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy—milked to the hilt by Vice President JD Vance, Trump’s heir apparent. After the debacle, most doubted its revival in the near future.
However, the minerals deal between the United States and Ukraine was officially signed on 30 April. With this agreement, the Trump administration finally notched its first—and thus far only—tangible achievement to present to both the international community and its electorate.
In the first 100 days, dominated by erratic posturing on allies and adversaries, scattershot tariff wars, and chaotic foreign policy manoeuvers, this deal stands out not just for its substance but for its sheer survival through the noise. It has been the single concrete outcome amid confusion and controversy—whether it’s enough to quiet the broader strategic dissonance remains to be seen.
Why the first deal failed
Trump’s initial strategy toward Ukraine was driven less by diplomacy than by coercion. His administration leaned hard on Kyiv to accept a ceasefire—or more bluntly, to accept whatever terms Trump dictated. In a bid to pressure Kyiv, Washington cut back weapons deliveries and intelligence sharing, tightening the screws just as Ukraine faced mounting pressure from Russia’s indiscriminate attack on civilians and energy infrastructure.
At the same time, the Trump administration began openly cosying up to Moscow, echoing Russian talking points. This sent shockwaves through European capitals, forcing a scramble to recalibrate what the future of the transatlantic alliance might look like under Trump 2.0.
Despite direct phone calls and shuttle diplomacy carrying sticks for Ukraine and carrots for Moscow, the administration’s efforts yielded little. Any progress it made collapsed within hours. The reality was becoming painfully clear: Trump had grossly underestimated the complexity and endurance of the war in Ukraine.
As the administration’s tariff threats grew louder and Trump delivered his bombastic ‘Liberation Day’ commandments, global attention shifted. The minerals deal, once the centrepiece of Trump’s Ukraine policy, was quietly forgotten. The world moved on.
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From Paris to St Peter’s Basilica
The shift in Trump’s Ukraine strategy became evident after two pivotal events. The first was the Paris talks, hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron on 17 April. In Paris, Marco Rubio and Steve Witkoff—then serving as a special envoy to the Middle East and now tipped to become the next National Security Advisor—held their most substantial discussions with leaders from the UK, France, Germany, and Ukraine. This marked the Trump administration’s first clear acknowledgement that resolving the Ukraine war requires giving Europe and Ukraine a central role in determining its outcome.
The second opportunity came quickly, at the funeral of Pope Francis in Rome on 26 April. There, Trump and Zelenskyy met in person for the first time since their Oval Office spat. Images of the two leaders in seemingly good spirits at St Peter’s Basilica circulated online, indicating a tentative thaw in the strained relationship.
Within a week of this encounter came the breakthrough: the stalled US-Ukraine minerals deal had been officially signed. Ukraine hailed it as the first concrete result from the Vatican meeting, and the US called it historic.
Just hours later, a second significant development followed—President Trump approved $50 million in direct weapons sales to Ukraine. Even though the US has been the biggest military support to Ukraine under the Biden administration, Trump 2.0 had put a freeze on further military aid or sales. This marked the new administration’s first military sale to Ukraine, a notable reversal given his earlier refusal to sell Patriot air defence systems to Kyiv.
Though the $50 million weapons sales number is relatively modest compared to Ukraine’s broader defence needs, it signals a shift in tone. More revealing is the method of the sale. The deal was conducted through the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) mechanism, as opposed to the more tightly controlled Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, which is managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
DCS allows purchasing countries to negotiate directly with defence companies, making it a more flexible and market-driven approach.
Trump is reframing military aid as a transactional opportunity for the US defence industry. For Ukraine, this evolving relationship is one they’ve long anticipated. While the dependency on US arms remains, entering into a business-like arrangement may finally free Kyiv from the exhausting ritual of repeatedly proving its gratitude—when in the eyes of Trump’s inner circle, no number of “thank yous” can ever suffice.
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What changed
What makes the newly signed US-Ukraine minerals deal noteworthy is the substantial changes it went through. The initial version of the agreement had been criticised as exploitative, offering the US access to Ukraine’s untapped rare earth resources at throwaway prices. It was part of a broader US strategy to counter China’s dominance in the global rare earth elements market. Trump had openly emphasised his need for this deal and its strategic value to the US.
The original version failed in part due to its lopsided terms. It gave little room for European investment and demanded that Ukraine contribute 67 per cent of the joint investment fund, while the US would only offer 33 per cent. In contrast, the final agreement now calls for equal contributions from both sides, marking a major win for Kyiv. Another significant revision eliminates any requirement for Ukraine to repay US aid provided since 2022 in any arrears—an earlier condition that had sparked dismay in Ukrainian and European circles.
The agreement now aligns more closely with Ukraine’s constitutional framework for EU accession and no longer works against it. It also includes a strengthened role for the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), tasked with raising further investments. Crucially, the deal now offers tax-free status to fund contributions, correcting a previous clause that would have imposed burdensome tax liabilities.
Although Trump remains firm that NATO membership for Ukraine is off the table, he has suggested that American presence under this economic partnership could serve as a ‘de facto’ security guarantee. Whether this claim will hold weight remains to be seen.
At present, the idea appears far-fetched, as the primary challenge is attracting sufficient investment into Ukraine, without which any de facto security guarantees proposed by the US are unlikely to be effective.
Nevertheless, the deal is the clearest sign yet that the Trump administration is beginning to engage with Ukraine in a more cooperative, rather than confrontational, manner. The real test will come if Trump follows through with additional actions, such as sanctioning Russia’s shadow fleet and imposing other fiscal sanctions, to pressure the Kremlin into de-escalation.
The next step is ratification by Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, and in Washington, where Trump currently enjoys solid support. For now, the deal marks a diplomatic win for Kyiv and for European leaders who have persistently sought a just and lasting peace for Ukraine as crucial for the security of the continent.
For New Delhi, there has been studied silence on mediation in the Ukraine war, largely shaped by Trump’s rhetoric that distances the US from Europe and Ukraine. India has taken a pragmatic approach, positioning itself to benefit from any thaw in US-Russia relations.
While Trump’s unpredictability has created widespread uncertainty, India still stands to gain from a renewed American engagement in Ukraine. A stronger US presence could open up opportunities for Indian businesses to participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction. This involvement would allow India to collaborate with European and American partners in rebuilding efforts, aligning economic interests with diplomatic gains.
It could elevate India’s global image as a committed humanitarian and development partner, contributing to Ukraine’s post-war recovery—an optimal outcome of New Delhi’s long–standing neutrality.
Swasti Rao is a consulting editor at ThePrint and a foreign policy expert. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)
Where to begin. This article is full of delusions. First of all majority of the mineral rich areas are already controlled by Russia. Secondly, this deal doesn’t bring Ukraine any closer to peace. If anything Russia will now prosecute the SMO to the bitter end. And Trump’s claim to be an antiwar President has evaporated as now he will be stuck with the Ukraine war tar-baby.
And India being tapped to rebuild? Yes, Ukraine may import cheap laborers for reconstruction but let’s be honest, the contracts will go to the US construction companies. And this is all riding on the hopes that there will be anything left to rebuild on in Ukraine. Their economy is in tatters, their population is shrinking and they’ve already sold off everything of value to various international investors.
We just witnessed an entire nation sold into perpetual slavery in the 21st century.