Security was at its highest, yet the surprise was absolute and the effect profound when Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’ political face and Iran’s state guest for its presidential inauguration, was assassinated in Tehran on 31 July. The consequences of this benchmark covert operation are still unfolding. While Iran’s retaliatory action in the near future is a given, the worst-case scenario is that this assassination may end up becoming the region’s Sarajevo moment.
There is no doubt that this covert operation was carried out by Israel; however, how it was carried out is still shrouded in mystery. Expectedly and as per its policy, Israel has neither denied nor claimed responsibility for this high-profile operation. Even Iran has been ambiguous about the method used for the assassination to minimise the damage from the exposure of its security vulnerabilities.
Overall, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh is a benchmark for covert operations. Its timing, target profile, impact, ambiguity, and technological finesse offer important lessons for India’s political and intelligence leadership.
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Why did Israel do it?
It is well known that since its birth, Israel has a declared policy of killing its enemies. Up to the 1970s, it ruthlessly pursued the surviving Nazi war criminals responsible for the “final solution” of exterminating the Jews. Thereafter, the focus shifted to Palestinian terrorists and leaders of Iran’s nuclear projects of Iran, with great success. The dogged pursuit of the perpetrators of the Munich Olympics massacre is part of covert folklore.
With Arab adversary nations neutralised by its diplomacy and military superiority, Israel has, in the last decade, targeted the civilian and military leadership of the Axis of Resistance—a coalition of Iran, Palestine’s Hamas, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, and various Shi’ite Muslim militias in Iraq and Syria. A notable feature of recent covert operations has been the use of sophisticated technology. This includes air, sea, and drone-delivered kinetic/explosive warhead missiles, short-range missiles/drones deployed by its agents or proxies in target countries, and autonomous weapon systems assembled and remotely fired by agents. Its external intelligence agency, Mossad, has extensive penetration of all target countries, enabling it to not only execute technology-driven operations but also to carry out all types of direct operations with its agents.
But as invariably happens, perceived invincibility leads to complacency. On 7 October 2023, Israel was caught off guard. In one of the most ruthless terrorist actions, 695 Israeli civilians, 373 security personnel, and 71 foreigners were killed within a span of a few hours, and 251 civilians and soldiers were taken hostage. The Israeli public and media overwhelmingly hold Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the intelligence agencies responsible for the biggest national security disaster since the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The Pyrrhic and yet incomplete victory in Gaza has not been enough to assuage public outrage. A spectacular action was required to regain lost prestige, and the visit of Ismail Haniyeh to Tehran offered that opportunity.
The assassination of the head of Hamas’ Political Bureau is in tune with Israel’s declared aim in this war—absolute defeat and destruction of Hamas. It also exposes the impotence of Iran against the might of Israel. Above all, it restores the prestige and popularity of Netanyahu and Mossad.
However, two risks were obvious: the ongoing ceasefire talks due to US and international pressure, and the wider escalation of the conflict. Israel was a reluctant participant in the ceasefire talks, and the scuttling of these is of no consequence. The limitations of Iran’s capability for direct intervention were exposed in its missile and drone attack on 13 April, which did only minor damage. Hamas is fighting in the tunnels. Houthis can do no more than what they have done so far. This leaves only Hezbollah, which Israel is probably keen to decimate with a swift high-technology-based operation.
How was it done?
While speculations abound, defence analysts and media have zeroed in on three possible methods, each with inherent variations, that could have been used to carry out the attack on Ismail Haniyeh. First, a missile strike from an aircraft or drone from outside Iran. Second, a short-range missile from a drone from inside Iran. Third, a bomb planted by Mossad agents or proxies in the room of the target. All three methods are well within the capabilities of Israel.
Iran’s official news agency—Islamic Republic News Agency—was the first to report that “an airborne projectile” had been used at 2 am on 31 July to kill Ismail Haniyeh. The Fars News Agency, run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), also said that he had been “martyred by a projectile from the air”. These reports led to the theory about a missile being fired from an aircraft or drone. Since the assassination was a major intelligence and anti-drone/aircraft defence failure, the language of the official release was kept ambiguous. Israel has earlier demonstrated this capability during the April attack to destroy an Iranian S-300 air defence system. The same capability has been demonstrated in Lebanon and Syria to target Hamas/Hezbollah and Iranian generals respectively.
Then, on 1 August, the New York Times broke the story that the assassination was carried out by a bomb planted by Mossad through Iranian guards of the high-security guest house. It was even speculated that the bomb had been planted months in advance since Haniyeh stayed at the same guest house and in the same room during his frequent visits to Tehran. This allowed the planters of the bomb to exit Iran. The report also said that a large number of guards and commanders responsible for security lapses have been arrested and are under interrogation. Given Israel’s intelligence penetration, the probability of this method is high.
Since a bomb planted in a high-security guest house was most damaging for Iran’s prestige, and a missile strike from outside Iran signalled a failure of its anti-drone/missile defence, the IRGC put out a report about a short-range drone with a 7-kg warhead assembled and fired from within Iran by Israeli agents/proxies.
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Lessons for India
India faces a similar threat of terrorism from Pakistan as Israel does from Iran and its proxies. Our right-wing public opinion unanimously craves the Israeli model to deal with terrorism and conventional threats. Unfortunately, the focus is only on crude direct actions, as seen in Gaza. Little or no attention is paid to Israel’s sophisticated covert operations using high-end technology and deep intelligence penetration of adversary nations and terrorist organisations. Its covert operations are credible, rarely owned except in an active theatre like Lebanon, and target high-profile figures to enforce deterrence. It is the helpless adversary that cries foul and reveals the details of its failures. The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh is a case in point. Moreover, Israel has also created the conventional superiority to use brute force to enforce its deterrent when required.
Due to economic constraints and a lack of political will, India has been unable to create the military superiority necessary to enforce its deterrent. Our direct punitive strikes lack credibility and are not backed by superior technology, allowing Pakistan to respond in a quid pro quo manner as in the case of the 90-hour Balakot fiasco. We accepted the losses of a MiG-21 and the fratricide of a Mi-17 helicopter and became the laughing stock of the world with our incredulous claims.
There is no doubt that in the last decade, our intelligence penetration of Pakistan has improved manifold. A number of Indian and Pakistani terrorists responsible for terrorism in India have been killed by agents/proxies. Indeed, these operations are credible as they have been grudgingly acknowledged by the Pakistani government, media, and military. However, most of the targets were low-end leaders and some were semi-retired. The operations were crude, direct, and lacking in sophistication. Even our alleged operations in Canada and the US have left behind a trail.
What has been the impact? Has Pakistan been deterred? Are Lashkar-e-Taiba founder Hafiz Saeed, Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Maulana Masood Azhar, Hizbul Mujahideen and United Jehad Council head Syed Salahuddin, and their military mentors cowering in fear? The answer is a big no! India’s ownership of low-end operations, albeit indirectly and as part of electoral rhetoric by our highest political leadership, only proves the crudity of our intelligence operations.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (Retd) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post-retirement, he was a member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)