A great game is afoot, with two emerging superpowers—India and China—vying for influence in their neighbourhood and beyond. There is little doubt among geopolitical hawks that manoeuvres New Delhi and Beijing make in the Indo-Pacific will chart the course of the next century.
Like any other great game, this too has multiple dimensions and a cast of characters. For the sake of this argument, let us consider one key dimension central to lasting influence in the Indo-Pacific: maritime infrastructure.
Encompassing about one-fifth of the world’s sea area, the Indian Ocean supports roughly 80 per cent of the global maritime oil trade.
It is no secret that China has over the past decade mounted an all-out effort to encircle India in the Indian Ocean region by securing access to foreign ports for dual use—logistical and military. Besides catering to the routine needs of ocean-going ships, port terminals earmarked for dual use allow one to fortify one’s position at key strategic locations, act as a window for intelligence collection, and also offer an opportunity to establish one’s credentials as a reliable bilateral partner in an increasingly unstable world.
For now, it seems, Beijing wields a first-mover advantage given that the Chinese coastline has 34 major ports, including some of the largest in the world. To add to that, the Chinese own or operate nearly 100 ports in as many as 50 countries. China is also one among the top three builders of merchant ships and controls the second-largest merchant fleet globally.
In a July 2023 report, AidData identified eight ports outside mainland China where Beijing could set up naval bases within the next five years. These include Bata in Equatorial Guinea, Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Kribi in Cameroon, Nacala in Mozambique, Nouakchott in Mauritania, Ream in Cambodia and Vanuatu in the Pacific Islands.
Citing 123 projects worth an estimated $29.9 billion which it said funded the development or expansion of 78 ports in 46 countries by China, the report adds that for Beijing, setting up overseas naval bases is only a logical next step in its pursuit of greater influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Beijing made known its intentions to set up dual use ports and maritime infrastructure in a 2015 defence white paper, which identified “overseas interests” as a “strategic task” for the PLA. Two years later, in 2017, Beijing opened its first overseas military base—though describing it only as a ‘logistics facility’—near the port of Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa.
Another two years later, in 2019, a Chinese defence paper laid out the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plan to develop “overseas logistical facilities” to “address deficiencies in overseas operations and support”.
Cut to November 2021, when US intelligence alerted the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to construction of what they believed was a secret Chinese military facility in the port of Khalifa, where the Chinese shipping corporation Cosco operates a commercial container terminal. Construction work was halted, only to reportedly resume a year later.
At the same time, efforts to set up a military base in Equatorial Guinea—where China operates a deep-water commercial port (Bata)—as well as in Gabon, have come to naught.
One also cannot discount that the PLA Navy continues to make use of the global network of Chinese firms’ commercial transport infrastructure. According to a 2023 paper by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “The most significant observations of this existing dual-use capability emerge from the network of nearly 100 ocean ports owned and/or operated by PRC firms in foreign jurisdictions.”
This aggressive expansion of ports both domestically and around the world may give China an edge, as far as the great game with India is concerned.
Where India stands
Having taken note of this concerted effort by the Chinese to expand their influence, Indian policymakers are starting to realise the importance of dual-use infrastructure in this great game playing out in the Indo-Pacific.
The Indian coastline, according to data available with the shipping ministry, is dotted with 12 major and 200 non-major ports. While major ports are operated by the ministry, non-major ports are under the jurisdiction of the respective state maritime boards/governments.
It is well within India’s trade and security interests to fast track modernisation and expansion of these ports to equip them for dual use.
Another aspect worth mentioning is that data on Indian dual-use infrastructure, specifically ports, is deemed sensitive information that has not found its way into any publicly available study or research paper.
The Indian government did, however, in a response in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) in March 2021 reveal that the Indian Navy operates three dual-use naval air stations: Dabolim (Goa), Visakhapatnam (Andhra Pradesh) and Port Blair (Andaman And Nicobar Islands).
As for overseas ports, India has proven itself a reliable partner. This is perhaps why in February this year, India was granted access to a specific zone in the strategic Duqm Port in Oman. This port is arterial to shipping routes along the Gulf of Oman, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea.
In April, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) approved a proposal for India Ports Global Ltd (IPGL)—a wholly owned subsidiary of Sagarmala Development Company Ltd under the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways—to take over operations of the Sittwe port in Myanmar. This was the culmination of the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) approved in 2008. The Sittwe port was officially inaugurated by the then Indian minister for ports, shipping and waterways in May 2023.
That same month, India and Iran inked a 10-year contract to develop and operate two terminals in the port of Chabahar.
In this great game, Indian decision-makers must move with urgency to develop dual-use ports—not just to protect trade, but to strengthen national security and effectively counter China’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific.
Asha Jadeja is a Silicon Valley-based entrepreneur, venture capitalist, philanthropist and a ‘change agent’. She tweets @ashajadeja325. Views are personal.
The article is sponsored by the Motwani Jadeja Foundation.
Building and maintaining a pavement is a big deal in India. Let’s see if she can build and maintain dual-use ports.