What more can be written on the enduring tenacity of India-France relations, which stand as a master class in conducting bilateral ties in an uncertain world? Fine editorials have lately dissected various aspects of it, and the French embassy in New Delhi has been tweeting up a storm on the historicity, trust, relevance, and future commitments in India-France ties.
To start with, French President Emmanuel Macron is India’s Republic Day chief guest today, making France the only country that has been accorded this honour a record six times. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Macron’s bromance indeed has been riding the high tide.
What stands out this time is Modi’s hospitality, including introducing Macron to the splendour of Rajputana and a road show in Jaipur. These gestures clearly return the warmth Macron had accorded to him on France’s Bastille Day. As observed by senior scholar C Raja Mohan, a liberal France’s endorsement of India, right after a spectacular Ram temple consecration, will be a net positive for New Delhi in Europe. For Modi, the bonhomie marks a splendid continuation of India’s unprecedented closeness with the West despite divergences on the Russia-Ukraine war.
That said, familiar issues remain on the agenda—military-industrial collaboration, Indo-Pacific and space cooperation, and pushing forward the civil nuclear project. Since Macron is coming with several CEOs, there’s also an obvious will to capitalise on the all-time-high bilateral trade.
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Defence-industry cooperation
During Modi’s visit to France as the Bastille Day chief guest, the two leaders signed Horizon 2047, a roadmap to set the course for the bilateral relationship up to 2047. It will mark the centenary of India’s independence and the golden jubilee of the India-France strategic partnership.
Horizon 2047 rests on three pillars—France’s role in the development of a self-reliant defence, industrial, and technological base in India; bilateral, trilateral, and triangular cooperation in the Indo Pacific; and, finally, cutting-edge collaboration in the space sector. The document also outlines a comprehensive matrix for India-France cooperation across several areas, drawing from their mutual commitment to strategic autonomy and multipolarity.
As noted earlier, defence industry cooperation has been and will be the star performer in the wider India- France cooperation matrix.
A deal on Rafale Marines for the Indian Navy is close to getting inked and industrial cooperation for motorisation of heavy-lift helicopters under the Indian Multi Role Helicopter (IMRH) programme has advanced with a shareholder’s agreement between France’s Safran Helicopter Engines and India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). Cooperation on Shakti, a turbo shaft engine for advanced light and combat helicopters, has also progressed significantly.
Another big-ticket announcement in the aviation sector could be the Indian Air Force’s acquisition of 114 Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA). If the Rafale Marines deal is finalised, it might give a further boost to France for the MRFA bidding. For the Indian Air Force to reach the desired 42 squadrons by 2040, another 450 combat aircraft will need to be inducted. The majority will come from indigenously manufactured Tejas variants (to be powered by the GE 414 engine). However, that alone would fall short of the target even after factoring in the recent decision by the DAC to procure 12 Sukhoi-30MKIs from HAL.
Procuring 114 MRFAs from France could help bridge the gap. There is a strong argument of economies of scale in Dassault delivering India- specific models across multiple platforms.
There are grand plans for defence industry cooperation for the naval sector too. DRDO has signed an agreement with Naval Group France to upgrade the Kalvari Class submarines—export derivatives of the French Scorpene class submarines built in India under the P75-Kalvari programme. In addition to the initial acquisition of six Kalvari attack subs, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has cleared an additional purchase of three more submarines in 2023. In view of the above upgrade, India has set up a technical office of the DRDO at its embassy in Paris. The government -to-government (G2G) pathway is best suited for tweaking issues with required indigenous content and increasing Foreign Direct Investment limits when the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) deems fit. Therefore, in the case of India and France, once cleared by the DAC, the modalities can be met at a relatively higher pace in France.
Indo-Pacific strategy
The Indo-Pacific is the domain where the maritime security interests of India and France converge and expand.
There is more to France’s Indo-Pacific strategy than meets the eye. Officially, it offers a ‘third way’ to regional actors that do not wish to get caught up in the great power contestation between the US and China. Whether or not France has the military or maritime capabilities to actually provide a third way can be contested, but what can be reasonably deduced from the larger security environment is that it would retain a strategic posture and align with the US if and when push comes to shove. That said, it would try to avoid getting to that situation by emboldening a third front—a multi-polar network of trilateral and triangular cooperation with a strong developmental agenda where India is key.
Not many know that the French Development Agency (AFD) is heavily invested in France’s Indo-Pacific strategy. A unique India-France model, the Indo-Pacific Triangular Development Cooperation ( IPTDC) Fund, has been created to support climate- and SDG-focused innovations from other countries. The beauty of this initiative is that it builds on the wider synergy of the India- EU connectivity partnership launched in 2021.
The Indo-Pacific is also a region where France and India are together in nimble trilaterals with Australia and UAE. Impending crises might push France to take a more visible role in protecting freedom of navigation.
The Red Sea crisis, which by most estimates is far from being resolved, presents a quagmire. Should the US withdraw under Trump, pressure might mount on other European maritime powers like the UK and France to address the security of sea lanes. At the end of the day, Europe and India are far more dependent on the Red Sea’s routes than the US is.
Under such circumstances, new forms of trilateral cooperation between European actors and India doesn’t seem far-fetched.
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What’s ahead—opportunities and blips
The arena of space and space technologies promises to steer India-France collaboration in the future. As long-standing partners, the two sides recently institutionalised bilateral strategic space dialogue. Horizon 2047 sets out ambitious plans to strengthen scientific and commercial partnerships between CNES and ISRO. The two sides are also committed to strengthening sovereign access to space as a response to growing militarisation in the domain.
However, civil nuclear cooperation at the Jaitapur nuclear plant presents a challenge. Nuclear liability issues and technological hurdles have impeded the progress of the Electricité de France (EDF)-steered project. If actualised, it would be the world’s largest nuclear power station by net generation capacity.Finally, there seems to be a misplaced enthusiasm in India about France’s role in aiding the India- EU free-trade agreement (FTA) that has been under negotiation for many years now. What France could do, however, is enhance the upward trajectory of bilateral trade and FDI. It is already the top 11 FDI investors in India.
Despite their distinct regional contexts, both India and France, with their strong mooring in multipolarity and strategic autonomy, must firmly respond to the winds of change that underlie current geopolitical hostilities. Today’s molten global order will be shaped not only by capabilities and common interests, but also by a shared vision rooted in realism that will be larger than the sum of individual strengths and stakes.
The writer is an Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Center, at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)