The recent Israeli strike on Hamas leaders in Qatar has ruffled an already volatile Middle East chessboard. On the surface, Saudi Arabia’s newly signed defence pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan looks consequential, but for now, it is more symbolic than real. The deeper story lies elsewhere.
Violence in the region shows no sign of slowing. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—“Bibi” to supporters and detractors alike—appears determined to settle what he considers Israel’s defining struggle: the confrontation with Iran and its network of proxies. For him, this is not just geopolitics; it is about legacy. Netanyahu wants nothing less than to redraw the region’s order, and the consequences will extend well beyond the Middle East, reaching as far as New Delhi.
To grasp this escalation, one must view it as a political thriller where Netanyahu has rehearsed the climax for decades.
Bibi’s worldview
The roots of Iran-Israel hostility go back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Since then, Israel has vowed never to allow Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons. Netanyahu made this his central mission, openly calling for preemptive strikes since the 1990s and casting himself as Israel’s ultimate guardian.
For years, his actions were bound by US limits—Washington provided intelligence, cover, and support, but also imposed red lines. That equation changed after Hamas’ 7 October 2023 attack on Israel. Netanyahu used the assault to justify escalation, seizing unprecedented backing from the Trump administration, which went so far as to authorise a B2 bomber strike on Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility.
Despite Trump’s occasional rhetoric about deals with “all sides”, nothing of this scale moves in the Middle East without Washington’s consent. For now, Netanyahu has it. Israel will not stop short of closure—and with Trump’s support, Bibi believes his long-sought showdown is within reach.
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GCC’s calculated ambivalence
For decades, Iran projected influence through a web of proxies: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, alongside a patchwork of Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. Together, they formed the so-called “axis of resistance”, Tehran’s forward defence and regional leverage.
But the network is fraying. Hezbollah, long the centrepiece, has been pummeled by Israeli strikes that have killed its leaders and eroded its ability to act on Tehran’s behalf. Hamas, too, has seen its command structure shattered. Even the Houthis, long dominant in Yemen’s grinding conflict, are facing unprecedented Israeli pressure.
What once appeared as a resilient axis now looks fragmented and weakened.
Through much of this upheaval, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states kept their distance. The understanding was tacit: Israel would weaken Iran and its proxies, while the Gulf avoided entanglement. In effect, Israel did their “dirty work”.
That balance shifted when Israel struck Hamas leaders in Qatar, violating Qatari sovereignty and unsettling Gulf elites. Doha, which had stayed quiet even after Iranian missiles struck a US base on its soil in retaliation for the American bombing of Fordow, suddenly found itself exposed.
The GCC’s formal reaction was limited to routine condemnation. But Saudi Arabia quietly added a new twist—signing a defence pact with Pakistan. Symbolic or not, the move unsettled the region, signalling both deterrence to Tehran and diplomatic warmth toward Islamabad. The timing was telling: it came only hours after Riyadh publicly wished Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi a happy birthday.
Unfinished campaigns in Syria and Iraq
Since 7 October 2023, the Middle East has unfolded like a fast-paced thriller. If the ultimate climax is regime change in Tehran, there is little sign it is imminent. The more immediate “final chapter” appears to be Israel’s dismantling of Iran’s proxy network—at any cost.
That brings the spotlight to Iraq, following unfinished campaigns in Syria.
In July 2025, Israel struck Damascus under the pretext of protecting the Druze minority from the al–Sharaa government’s crackdowns. Strategically, the aim was to prevent Syria from consolidating military strength near its southern flank, close to the occupied Golan Heights. Israel has long courted the Druze, embedding itself in Syria’s sectarian politics.
What emerges is an implicit understanding between Israel and Turkey. Despite deep differences, the countries share a common goal: keeping the al–Sharaa regime destabilised. For Israel, southern Syria must stay demilitarised to block Iranian proxies. For Turkey, northern Syria must remain fractured to contain Kurdish militants. This convergence keeps Damascus boxed in, while Tehran and Moscow—distracted and weakened—struggle to shift the balance.
With Syria stalemated, Netanyahu would be preparing to turn toward Baghdad. Iraq’s strategic value hasn’t escaped others either. Just days ago, Sergei Shoigu, head of Russia’s National Security Council, visited Baghdad—likely an attempt to shore up Moscow’s fading influence in the region and in nearby Syria.
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The last proxy battleground
For Israel, Iraq is pivotal. Pro-Iranian militias there form the financial and logistical backbone of Tehran’s regional strategy, creating a land corridor linking Iran, Assad’s Syria, and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The 2003 US invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein opened the door for Iran. As Iraq descended into sectarian conflict, Tehran filled the vacuum, embedding itself across Iraq’s political class and paramilitary groups. By 2018, even the US military conceded that Iran was the “true victor” of the Iraq War.
Through Iraq, Tehran evaded sanctions, used banks to access foreign currency, and expanded export routes. For years, Iraq was the linchpin of Iran’s shadow economy.
But that dominance is waning. Baghdad has been cutting Tehran’s access to its financial system. During the 12-day war that saw US bombers hit Iranian nuclear sites, Iraq offered Tehran little more than symbolic support. Iran-backed militias, once quick to strike US forces, largely stood down.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, long viewed as sympathetic to Tehran, has recalibrated to avoid clashes with Washington or Tel Aviv. With national elections looming in November 2025, he is carefully signalling independence.
Lebanon tells a similar story. Anti-Hezbollah candidates are gaining momentum, reflecting public fatigue with Tehran’s proxies. Across the region, Iran’s aura of strength has eroded. Israel’s strikes have exposed its inability to defend or sustain its network.
For Netanyahu, Iraq represents both an opportunity and a necessity. It is the last major battleground before Tehran itself, although it may not require as much bloodshed as Israel’s other campaigns after October 2023.
The GCC may denounce Israeli aggression, but privately, few mourn the weakening of Iran’s proxies. Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis have long outlived their utility. For Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha, they are more irritants than assets, destabilising the region without constraining Israel.
Netanyahu knows such a favourable moment may not come again. A Trump administration willing to back him unconditionally, a distracted Europe, a weakened Russia bogged down in Ukraine, and an Iran exposed as fragile—these alignments create a unique window.
It’s a legacy issue for Bibi. He will not leave office without attempting to dismantle Iran’s proxy architecture once and for all.
Delhi dimension
For India, the strategic ripples are significant. The immediate concern is Pakistan’s diplomatic gain as it embeds itself deeper into the defence framework of the Middle East. How that affects New Delhi’s regional calculus will be the subject of a separate analysis. For now, the region remains the burning stage where Netanyahu’s long-anticipated climax plays out.
Swasti Rao is a Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)