New Delhi: Ideated as special adjudicatory bodies to review administrative decisions, tribunals across sectors have expanded their powers beyond the ambit of administrative laws. The expectation was that the commercial tribunals would deliver better outcomes than traditional courts. However, in practice, they struggle with the same problems.
Both tribunals and courts face problems, such as pendency, an increasing caseload, or delays and vacancies, says the DAKSH report on ‘The State of Tribunals 2025’, a comprehensive database on India’s commercial tribunals.
DAKSH is a research institute dedicated to law and justice reforms in India, that routinely works with data, policy research and stakeholder engagement. The report covers 10 major commercial tribunals across company law, taxation, securities, debt recovery, insolvency, energy, telecom and goods & services tax.
“Tribunals were meant to deliver speed, expertise, and accessibility. In practice, they have created a fragmented system, raised persistent concerns about independence, and delivered outcomes no better than courts,” the report states.
Breaking down the data in the DAKSH Report this year, ThePrint, in this report, explains what tribunals are, how they differ from courts, the reasons behind the expectation that they will have an advantage over courts, and how they are functioning today.
According to the 242-page report, tribunals came to be seen as an alternative to courts after the 42nd Amendment in 1976, also known as the “mini Constitution”, as it made substantial changes to the governing document.
In 1976, intense political tensions between the executive and the judiciary led to the tribunals, according to the report. The 42nd Amendment sought to curtail the powers of the higher judiciary, the report says, adding that the creation of tribunals under the control of parent ministries appears to have been one such move.
Expectations vs reality
The DAKSH Report states there were three reasons why there was an expectation that tribunals would have advantages over traditional courts. These were the need for specialisation and technical expertise, faster resolution through simple procedures, and access at lower costs.
However, the report finds that tribunals mostly “morphed into courts with limited subject-matter jurisdiction” in their functioning.
The DAKSH Report states that tribunals, in a well-functioning judicial system, are essential for upholding the law, enabling economic activities, and enforcing contractual, social, and political rights. It, however, adds that the entire justification for having a parallel adjudicatory system hinged on the premise that tribunals differ from courts. The report emphasises that if the courts and tribunals function alike, it creates a separate track for justice, thereby fragmenting the system.
The DAKSH Report, however, states that there has been little to no improvement over the years, despite several reforms suggested to resolve problems that plague tribunals.
It also points out that the differences between courts and tribunals are becoming increasingly non-existent. Citing Gráinne McKeever, a professor of law at the United Kingdom-based Ulster University, the report says that if you compare a lower-tier civil court and an administrative tribunal, the differences are more “presumed than real”.
Status quo and challenges
Broadly, the DAKSH Report outlines two main ways tribunals have come to be seen—firstly, as a purely administrative body, and secondly, as mere “appendages of the government departments or courts”.
In the status quo, however, many tribunals, such as the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT), serve as appellate courts for citizen-state disputes that regulators initially decide. Others adjudicate disputes between private parties, such as the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), which deals with insolvency cases.
Subsequently, the report looks at some tribunals in detail. These include the 1941-established Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) and the Industrial Tribunals created under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Threefold challenges cropped up while setting up tribunals, the DAKSH Report says. The first is independence from the government in matters of funding, appointments, and remuneration. Contrary to popular perception, the Ministry of Law and Justice does not control the funding of tribunals; instead, the ministries concerned govern them. In the 2019 ruling, Rojer Mathew vs South Indian Bank, the Supreme Court held that the executive remains in charge of appointments, as well as removals, of tribunal members.
The second challenge to the functioning of the tribunals comprises administrative concerns about delays as well as pendencies. Although the report stresses that delay remains a “broader systemic problem” in the legal system, the central concern—whether the creation of such tribunals is justified—remains unresolved.
The final challenge outlined in the DAKSH Report deals with abolishing and consolidating certain tribunals. The Centre moved a bill in the Lok Sabha in 2021—The Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service). However, six months later, it stood withdrawn. Essentially, the Bill sought to dissolve or abolish certain existing appellate bodies, thereby transferring their functions to other existing judicial bodies. Tribunals the Bill wanted to cancel include the Appellate Tribunal(s) under the 1952 Cinematograph Act and the 1957 Copyright Act.
Failure to follow through
Statutes created tribunals, which have been following simplified procedures, but certain sine qua non or essential ingredients must be there, the DAKSH Report says.
For tribunal members, acquiring the technical expertise in the subjects they will be dealing with becomes essential. For instance, a tax-focused tribunal, such as the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), must have members and judges—not only familiar with tax laws but also with other matters. Additionally, tribunals should have more speed and accessibility than courts.
The situation on the ground is slightly different. Many tribunals only function with a member today, despite “constantly reported vacancies across benches and tribunals”. An example of this is the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC), which delivers single-judge verdicts by a technical member or a judicial member.
“Third, there is a pervasive practice of filling technical member positions with retired bureaucrats, who often lack relevant subject-matter experience,” the report says.
The fourth and final problem? Appeals against tribunal orders before the High Court or the Supreme Court erode the advantage of having specialised expertise at the appellate level.
Citing the dire need for reform, the DAKSH Report says that tribunals have largely failed to deliver on the features that led to their creation in the first place, such as speed, expertise and uniformity. The report suggests remedies, such as improving the existing judicial and physical infrastructure of the tribunals, and taking action after post-evaluation of their performance by the Comptroller and Auditor General, or else, the Law Commission of India.
The problem, however, lies in the fact that as of now, the Indian government lacks the institutional capacity to conduct such assessments or evaluations of tribunals. However, it can take a page out of the United States’ book, with bodies such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which remain independent of the executive, routinely evaluating the functioning of adjudicatory systems in America.
(Edited by Madhurita Goswami)
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