New Delhi: Connect with a “human resource” manager on social media, send in a video resume along with a short written description of yourself, and arrange for a visa and flight tickets. That’s all it takes to land a job in Cambodia’s multi-billion dollar cybercrime industry.
Operating on an industrial scale out of compounds infamously labelled ‘scam farms’, the industry landed on the radar of Indian investigative agencies after the sudden boom in ‘digital arrest’ scams. The crackdown, however, led only to the arrest of mule account holders, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) providers and those returning to India to recruit others.
In Part 2 of this two-part series, ThePrint takes a closer look at the ease with which ‘scam farms’ in Cambodia and Laos recruit Indians, function like organised call centres, and evade the law.
“Recruiting nationality: Indonesia, India, Nepal, Philippines. Salary: 800-1000$. Full attendance 100$. 1 month two days off. Working hours 10, contract duration 11 months. Requisites: Strong expression ability, and obedience to company arrangements. Working address: Phnom Penh,” reads a message on the Telegram group ‘Jobs in Cambodia’.
Facebook and Instagram, too, are flooded with similar messages posted by individuals identifying themselves as “human resource” managers.
One recruiter on Telegram, Pao Pao, told ThePrint that new recruits submit their passports upon arrival, are given accommodation on company premises, and are only allowed to leave the compound thrice a week.
Pao Pao also offered a guarantee for multiple interviews and a subsequent job offer. Asked to describe the job profile, Pao Pao replied: “love scam”.
Recruiters like Pao Pao on Telegram even share video tutorials to help job seekers record a video resume. While some recruiters lie about the actual job profile and end up forcing recruits into ‘cyber slavery’, other job seekers enter this world of cybercrime knowing fully well what they are getting into.
As ThePrint reported earlier, at least 540 Indian citizens detained from ‘scam farms’ in Cambodia were repatriated on 10 March.
Recruiting tech support & mule account operators
Chinese bosses occupy the top tier in the ‘digital arrest’ ecosystem.
Below them are multiple companies that employ trainers, recruiters, mule account providers and SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) service providers.
These function like any other incorporated corporate firm with a call centre, a tech support team, VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) providers, and an accounts department.
As ThePrint reported in Part 1 of this series, some like Alwar resident Suresh Kumar Sain return to India and recruit others from their native villages, while others land these jobs through online postings.
Once hired, the recruits are assigned a “platform” depending on their country of origin and their linguistic skills. Those who complete training also have the option to train others. For instance, a recruit from India stands a chance to train newer recruits to join the “Indian platform”.
Trainers, recruits and members of the tech team work from the compound, along with some of the main account operators, while others are based out of the country from where ‘targets’ are being scoped.
Mule account operators, too, are hired both offline and online by members of the syndicate based in their shared country of origin. It’s not uncommon to spot a social media post or closed group named: “Need bank account for company”. Mule account operators route the proceeds of crime to various bank accounts, withdraw some of it and convert the rest into bitcoins before closing the account used in the process, and opening another.
As revealed in Part 1 of this series, about 30 percent of the total amount generated by each scam is distributed to the mule account operators.
In February this year, the Delhi police arrested three men accused of fraudulently acquiring SIP trunk to set up VoIP services with an intent to facilitate these services to scam farms in Cambodia, Thailand and Canada.
According to police sources, those arrested were operating out of a rented co-working space in Haryana’s Gurugram. “Indian landline numbers would be generated with these trunk services and then they were routed. If one number is blacklisted or blocked, another can be generated. When the calls were traced, the IPs were found to be originating from Cambodia, Thailand and Canada,” DCP (Outer North) Nidhin Valsan told ThePrint.
The three men arrested by police are: Ajaydeep Prasad, a BTech graduate and MBA who allegedly acquired the SIP trunk and rented the co-working space; Abhishek Srivastava, a tech and hardware expert who helped with the set-up; and Ashutosh Bora, another BTech graduate who was also pursuing law and allegedly provided cybercrime syndicates operating overseas with access to SIP trunk calling services.
Bora (30), said police sources, worked in Dubai for two years before returning to India and starting a sports management firm. He was first arrested in 2021 in Gurugram, and later in Mumbai. In 2023, he was arrested again, this time in Noida, in connection with a cybercrime case.
He was also arrested in another case pertaining to fraudulent calls, in Panipat, and was out on bail when the Delhi police arrested him.
“Bora during interrogation said this case left him with a huge debt. He met some people during his time in prison in the first case after which he started the SIP trunk service company,” a senior police officer said.
The ‘digital arrest’ script
The premise of a ‘digital arrest’ scam rests fundamentally on impersonation of officers from the Crime Branch, CBI, NCB, ED or Customs. Scammers have also been known to impersonate courier company executives, TRAI officials and even judges who hold court and pass sentences virtually.
As explained by investigators probing cases of ‘digital arrest’, the first stage is to establish contact with the target through a WhatsApp call from an international number. It could also be a normal call with an IVR voice asking the target to press a number to speak to a courier service executive about a problem with a parcel. If it’s a WhatsApp call, the caller ID is likely to reflect the photo of a top police officer, or even a senior CBI officer.
The scamster will then introduce himself as a law enforcement officer and tell the target that his/her bank account was used for commission of illegal activities, or that the target’s name has come up during a probe into a multi-million dollar scam. Quick on their toes, scamsters might also drop references to the target’s family members, telling the target that a son or a spouse was embroiled in a scam or caught smuggling gold or tiger skin.
Once the premise is set and the scamster is convinced that the target is in a state of panic, the target is instructed to join a Skype call.
During this Skype call, scamsters impersonate law enforcement officers. Their faces may or may not be completely visible but they would flash fake badges or show forged stamped documents. They then flush out details of the target’s bank account, assets and Aadhaar card.
At this stage, the target is informed that he/she is under ‘digital arrest’.
From this point on, the target is cautioned against contacting family or friends. “The idea is to make the victim panic and keep intimidating him or her. Threats are issued regularly and the victim is kept under strict surveillance,” said a second senior police officer, explaining the process.
In some cases, scamsters even go to the extent of holding a “fast trial” on video call, with fellow schemers posing as judges. During these hearings, a sham verdict is issued, and the target directed to pay a ‘penalty’.
The ‘digital arrest’ scam, like most others, relies primarily on the target’s personal information which is traded openly like any other commodity.
Vishal Vikram Singh, Additional Superintendent of Police (ASP), Uttar Pradesh Special Task Force (STF), told ThePrint that the scamsters “have access to your digital data and phone numbers”.
“They have two sources: your phone number that you give to e-commerce sites or shops, and your online data,” he said adding, that they also track a target’s social media activity. “Information is power and these scamsters have it. They know your name, age group, financial condition and even how many people are there in your family,” Singh added.
Hurdles in probing ‘digital arrest’ scams
For investigative agencies probing ‘digital arrest’ cases, hurdles in the probe include tracing the money trail, locating the accused and drawing a link between them and their bosses calling the shots from overseas.
Missing the golden hour due to delay between the commission of the crime and it being reported to the police also hinders the pace of investigation.
“Even when we manage to arrest some accused and trace some of the money, a chunk of it has been sent abroad in bitcoin. There is no way we can find that money. Moreover, those arrested here often can’t identify other co-accused with their actual names since they have only spoken on WhatsApp calls,” explained the first senior police officer quoted earlier.
In Ashutosh Bora’s case, sources said he introduced himself to co-accused Ajaydeep Prasad as ‘Rajesh’. Investigators also found that Bora was in touch with one Najmul from Bangladesh and one Pushpa from Qatar.
“They met on a Telegram group and had international numbers. However, one can’t be sure if these two accused are actually based in these countries since there are several apps available online through which international numbers can be generated for internet calling,” the second senior police officer said, adding that Bora identified one Md Ali as the mastermind.
A third senior police official pointed out that the investigation into ‘digital arrest’ cases is largely dependent on when the crime is reported.
“Calls, IP addresses and bank accounts in which the money is deposited have to be tracked simultaneously. In most cases, once the first arrest is made, others go into hiding and delete the records,” the officer added.
What about the bosses running the show? They control these syndicates from different parts of the world, minting millions of dollars, all while remaining beyond the reach of Indian law enforcement agencies.
(Edited by Amrtansh Arora)
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