Explaining the last round of his half-yearly credit policies, RBI governor Y V Reddy had used an interesting expression, “baby steps”, to explain his approach of hastening slowly on some key issues. You may think the governor was being cautious as central bankers usually tend to be. But so are diplomats.
It is in the very nature of high-strategy making that change happens slowly, imperceptibly. Powerful nations that take themselves seriously, that wish to be taken seriously by the world, do not make U-turns. They take a long-term worldview, decide where they want to see themselves in that time frame, and then initiate tiny baby steps in that direction. To recall the immortal words of the late P V Narasimha Rao, spoken to me in NDTV’s Walk The Talk, you cannot be seen to be making U-turns. You have to make it look as if the ground under your feet is moving, and you just have your feet planted firmly on it.
A good illustration of this is the different ways India and Pakistan responded to 9/11, arguably the most significant moment in global relations since the end of the Cold War. Pakistan, uncertain and nervous, its leadership lacking legitimacy at home and credibility overseas, made a quick U-turn. George Bush underlined that in his speech last week at The Asia Society. It was one of the three countries that recognised the Taliban until then, he said, and then in just two days, it was a full partner in the “war against terror.” That moment was significant enough for the ground to be moving under India’s feet as well. Until then, Indian strategists were still dining on Pakistan’s isolation following Kargil, Musharraf’s coup and Clinton’s open reprimands. Now Pakistan was a key US ally in terror. The equation had changed overnight.
But India’s strategists took the blow and continued to move in the same post-Pokhran II path. The objective, acceptance of India as a responsible nuclear power, global disapproval for cross-border terrorism, a movement towards eventual settlement and peace with Pakistan ‘ and China ‘ and acknowledgement of India’s claims to the high table in the comity of nations were the four wheels of this movement. Looking back, you have to say today that between Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Brajesh Mishra, Jaswant Singh and Yashwant Sinha, they managed this remarkably well, even if in gentle, tiny baby steps. The only hiccup was the attack on Parliament, that necessitated coercive diplomacy. There were risks in that strategy and Vajpayee chose the moment of exit astutely, with more than a baby step at Srinagar in the April of 2003.
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If you take a look at how this strategy unfolds Pokhran-II onwards, you will see one consistent thread. Even though Pokhran-II was a slap in Washington’s face and drew a furious response from Clinton, India’s strategists always worked on the belief that if their four-point objective was to be reached, America will have to brought fully on board. India will never be accepted as a responsible nuclear power without Washington’s endorsement, and better Indo-US relations were a pre-requisite for a settlement with Pakistan. Without Washington’s stabilising and moderating influence, there was no knowing what new surprise Pakistan will spring at which point. To put it rather simplistically, it was a bit like the Camp David process, where Colin Powell was to be to Pervez Musharraf what Henry Kissinger was to Anwar Sadat.
Manmohan Singh invited some of us, editors, for breakfast just a couple of weeks after he had taken over as prime minister. What’s been your most surprising discovery in the job, I think Vinod Mehta of Outlook asked him. “Foreign policy and security, ” the Prime Minister said. He said he was spending a lot of time reading and talking to his officers on these issues. Now not even his bitterest critics would deny that he has a first-rate mind. He, therefore, began his own baby steps in the same direction. There was no loss of momentum, no change in direction. The one thing that changed was a little nuance in the foreign policy discourse was the mention of pan-Islamic terror, an expression so freely used earlier, now disappeared. To that extent, Singh de-communalised foreign policy while keeping its essence and subsequently, as his equations with Bush and Musharraf improved and his confidence in the saddle grew and he began some acceleration.
That is why the last 12 months have seen more movement on our foreign policy front than you would expect to see in years. First, Musharraf has moved on a great distance from the old Pakistani position on plebiscite and even territory in Kashmir. He first stated that clearly when visiting India during the 2005 cricket series and has not resiled. India has created plenty of public opinion in favour of a settlement that could involve significant changes in Kashmir’s status with any exchange of territory or dilution of sovereignty. And America, meanwhile, has moved dramatically close to accepting India as a responsible nuclear power. Bush has stated as much already and if the “nuclear deal” comes, it will end India’s isolation that began in 1974 with Pokhran I. Now, would you accept this as an independent, pro-Indian foreign policy, or not? In this entire process, has India sacrificed its national interest to further Washington’s cause any place? Or as Strobe Talbott (who questions the nuclear deal) implies often, India has succeeded in drawing the US into a relationship more of its own benefit?
Before getting trapped in self-flagellating arguments over whether a spectacularly successful foreign policy has been independent or not we must look at some fundamentals. The Prime Minister often talks of “enlightened national interest”. But how is it defined? The truth is, its three basic postulates have remained unchanged since Indira Gandhi’s high point at Simla.
These are one, India’s current territorial frontiers must be protected (so no further loss is acceptable, nor is there any irredentism on land already lost to China or Pakistan); two, India should have total control and freedom over its strategic (nuclear) assets and doctrine; and third, that India’s pre-eminence in neighbourhood is strengthened. In three and half decades since these fundamental principles were crafted, only one thing has changed. An addition, actually, that India should carry sufficient weight in the changing world to get the best possible deal for its entrepreneurs and products, whether through bilateral agreements, multi-lateral trade protocols, or through sovereign clout in the world of global banking and finance. If you examine India’s global position dispassionately, you will be surprised by how much distance we have already travelled towards these objectives. The question to raise in these doubting times, when ideology sometimes gets confused for strategy is, could India have come this far without an “independent” foreign policy? If the answer is no, I rest my case.
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