While there is a lot of chatter about various strategies that India could adopt in the wake of the recent PLA aggression and continued military build up in Eastern and Northern Ladakh, there appears to be a sense of acceptance creeping in that not much is going to change as the summer passes by and the snows come in.
The expanding asymmetry in comprehensive national power between India and China means that any indirect strategies that are being furthered by India would largely act as insignificant pinpricks on the dragon’s scales. Among these are economic leverages, diplomatic posturing, demonstration of military capability and political rhetoric. That the Indian military will give a bloody nose to the PLA in any kind of frontal engagement should the latter attempt to push further, albeit with heavy attrition to its own forces, is a ‘no brainer of an argument.’ What is also certain is that having achieved its operational objectives (not strategic ones), the Chinese will sit back and play by Sun Tzu’s maxim of ‘winning without fighting.’
Should India not make any significant moves beyond reinforcing its defensive potential, the stage could be set for another set of offensive and probing PLA-manoeuvres next summer, or even in the winter as some suggest, that would help them creep closer to their strategic objectives along the LAC. The ball is now wholly and truly in India’s court. Whether India’s politico-military establishment is willing to change the narrative soon, or continue its preference for reactive and overly restrained response strategies, will be an acid test for the Modi government.
History offers several pointers that indicate that once the PLA gets actively involved as an instrument of geopolitical manoeuvring, it can only be countered through coercion and aggression that unsettles the PLA commanders and causes significant attrition. The Nathu La and Chola skirmishes in 1967 was one such example wherein Major General Sagat Singh was given a free hand to respond and came up with a simple strategy of causing attrition as a means of conveying intent. Deng Xiaoping’s war against Vietnam (1979) ended in a stalemate and it was severe attrition to PLA forces that caused him to re-evaluate his strategic objective of subduing a recalcitrant Vietnam. China continues to be wary of Vietnam even today.
Soon after, PM Indira Gandhi authorised Operation Faulad in 1983 to explore the possibility of establishing a presence in ‘no man’s land’ immediately south of the McMahon Line in the Tawang Sector and examine whether there was potential to creep up to the McMahon line and restore the status quo that existed prior to 1962. It was a modest attempt that was countered by the Chinese in the summer of 1986 when the PLA set up a permanent camp in Wangdung in the Sumdorong Chu Valley.
By then Rajiv Gandhi was in power and when an assertive corps commander (Lt. Gen. Narahari) and his dynamic divisional commander (Maj. Gen. J.M. Singh) pushed forward and enveloped the PLA positions, they were advised not to ‘unnecessarily’ alarm the Chinese by the newly formed China Study Group, which advised them to pull back. General Sundarji, the army chief, had by then been thoroughly briefed by his generals on the ground and held fast through the winter with a further build up for possible offensive operations towards the nearest PLA base of Le in the summer of 1987. That was coercion at its best and drew an entire PLA division into the area. What it also did was to indicate to the Chinese that the Indians would be no pushovers and that it was time for a few decades of uneasy peace along the LAC under the umbrella of complex protocols. Did those decades of peace lull the Indian establishment into believing that that would be the new normal? Did border management replace border protection as KRA for the Indian Army?
Also read: India has two options with stubborn China. The better one involves taking the battle to them
In his book Why Leaders Choose War, Jonathan Renshon — an American political scientist — suggests that among Britain, France, the US, Israel and India, it is only India that does not subscribe to the idea of preventive war and proactive military responses as a solution to actual or perceived security threats. Renshon’s views draw attention to the larger question of whether India has been diffident or wise when it comes to ‘waging war’ or controlling the escalation ladder in ‘less-than-war-situations’ in contemporary times. Among Renshon’s list of preventive war factors, seizing windows of opportunity to engage in coercion or preventive military action rings true in the current imbroglio.
Thinking or debating whether India needs to shed its blinkers of age-old diffidence and issue a direct time-bound ultimatum to the PLA to vacate positions that have upset status quo can no longer be tantamount to blasphemy. Going one step further, being prepared to control the escalation ladder and challenge the ‘changed status quo’ with either quid-pro-quo military options, or calibrated application of firepower at selective places without holding back on options like air power or coercive maritime signalling, are difficult issues that must be seriously considered.
Recalibrating its relationships with its adversaries can help India define the extent to which it is willing to be pushed by them. While there is a growing willingness by India to talk about moving from reactive to proactive deterrence, it has not yet steadily walked the talk. ‘Willing and capable’ is a phrase that is commonly used in contemporary strategic debates. ‘Willing’ implies intent, resolve and a risk-taking propensity, while ‘capable’ signifies the state’s capacity to employ all elements of statecraft from a focused national security perspective to deter a rational and irrational adversary. Is India emerging as a ‘willing and capable’ state with respect to the current set of security challenges posed by China?
Much of what will unfold in the months ahead will be played in the mind, the media and on the international stage. If it remains there, Sun Tzu would have scored a victory. If the action moves back to the ground as it did on the night of 15 June, India may have twisted Mao’s proposition to say that ‘peace can prevail, but only through the barrel of two matching guns.’
Air Vice Marshal (Dr) Arjun Subramaniam (Retd) @rhinohistorian is a fighter pilot from the IAF, a military historian, air power analyst and strategic commentator. Views are personal.
The article first appeared on the Observer Research Foundation.
India is now in a position to change from reactive to proactive strategy and is ‘Willing and capable’ since it has realised the expansionist coercive designs of China and if China is not pushed back it will be a life long blot on the capabilities and willingness of the government. From its action, China does not appear to follow the agreement and will stay put in the positions which is holding and even develop these positions into permanent defences. India thus has to take immediate steps than to wait and watch and allow Chinese to the firm in.
India has to bear the cost factor of BORDER PROTECTION in mind. Not only will it be development of habitat, but also the cost of maintaining troops and equipment in the harshest terrain and climatic conditions.
India has to thus be SELECTIVE.
Unfortunately, military commanders responsible for an area, cannot be entrusted this responsibility of SELECTION. They are too emotionally attached to PROTECTION OF EVERY INCH, which included many INCHES which aren’t threatened.
The analysis has to be done by an independent team, which is already familiar with the area and which gives a hearing to the regional military commanders, but is adequately detached to decide for itself.
All wars cannot be avoided. This is the sad fact of life. Although we may engage in talks/diplomacy/trade barriers etc., but China will understand us only if we get really aggressive & take initiative rather than being defensive always. China still does not look at us as a serious military rival as it considers itself as top world power. Now we have to prove our resolve & strength to China.
Our first move will also be inline with current nationalistic mood in the country & ambitions of India as world power. But it should be a surprise offensive military move from India which would put China off-balance. Only such a stromg offensive move from India will calm down China and ultimately bring peace between the two countries.
Mr.Victor Gao in two articles that appeared in The Wire on 23rd and 24th July has clearly given an ultimatum to India (doubtlessly on behalf of those who matter in China).First he explains the reasons for the recent action in the following words
“Pangong lake, at the other end of the road, is 134 kms long and G219 skirts its eastern shore just as the road to DBO skirts its western edge. It therefore provides a swift route for moving large numbers of troops, artillery and armour from deep inside Tibet to places from which they can cut off the road to DBO within hours. Occupying the heights above finger 4, can give the PLA the capacity to interdict any Indian counter-attack on Chinese landing craft in the lake. A similar dominating position in the heights above the Galwan valley can give the PLA a second choke point from which to target the road from Ladakh to DBO. ”
Then in the second part of his article he asserts that in order to avoid war India must
(a) Dissociate itself from QUAD
(b) Recognize Gilgit as a part of Pakistan
(c) Join BRI which last would by itself achieve the above two objectives without political turmoil.
If this article is really written as a feeler on behalf of his Government then now the ball is now in India’s court.