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Old game, new rules

Indian and Pakistan have both followed a consistent policy of talk-talk, fight-fight since the Kashmir insurgency began in 1989. By invoking Balochistan and northern areas, Modi has changed it to 'you mess with our soft underbelly, we will mess with your most vulnerable region.

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In his Independence Day speech on Monday, Prime Minister Narendra Modi invoked the mention of Pak-occupied Kashmir, Gilgit and Northern Areas and even Balochistan. We need more evidence as policy now unfolds to conclude whether it is just rhetoric or a major shift in policy. But if we understand the prime minister’s style by now, it does seem to be a dramatic and fundamental shift.

India’s approach to Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir has gone through many changes and turning points over the past 70 years. But mostly these changes have indicated movement in one general direction: strengthening the status quo, and making what is de facto, ultimately de jure. Until 1965 India willingly engaged Pakistan to discuss all issues linked to Kashmir, including formulae involving exchange of territory. After India suffered setbacks in 1962 against China, long rounds of talks took place between Sardar Swaran Singh and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, railway minister and foreign minister of India and Pakistan, respectively. These were also held under pressure from western powers since India had sought their help for its defence forces to be able to defend itself against China.
Contemporary historians have noted that talks made some progress but, as Pakistan became more maximalist in its demands, Swaran Singh too began to stall.

Pakistan also seems to have concluded then that India was left so weak after the Chinese humiliation that it would rather grab all of Kashmir. It started first by fomenting trouble in the Kashmir Valley by staging what is famously known as the Hazratbal crisis. It was rumoured then that the holy relic, a strand of the Prophet’s hair kept in the shrine, had disappeared.

As India struggled with its many crises, including Jawahar Lal Nehru’s sudden death and succession by Lal Bahadur Shastri, Pakistan decided to check out India’s armed readiness and resolve by staging a limited military attack in the Rann of Kutch. India wasn’t prepared for it, and also taken by surprise with Pakistan’s use of tanks. Even tactically and strategically, many writers have noted since then, Shastri decided it was better not to shift resources this far but prepare for the larger battle.

He was right. A few months later, Pakistan sent thousands of infiltrators (mostly its regular soldiers) into Kashmir in Operation Gibraltar. And when that faltered, its leader Field Marshal Ayub Khan launched full-fledged war with Operation Grand Slam, with tanks and artillery in Chhamb. This led to an all-out war that lasted 22 days and ended with a stalemate. But Pakistan was the loser as nothing it had set out to gain was achieved. To its surprise, India’s relatively poorly equipped armed forces were able to deal with its recently acquired American firepower effectively. The best account of this crucial phase is to be found in The Monsoon War, a recently published landmark book by Capt Amarinder Singh and Lt-Gen T.S. Shergill.


Also read: Beijing’s CPEC is the new East India Company in Balochistan


 

The 1965 misadventure had one significant consequence for Pakistan. Effectively, it put the clock back on the post-1948, UN-supervised peace process, negotiations and the understanding on plebiscite. Having tried to take Kashmir militarily and failed, Pakistan could never go back to the UN resolutions again. This process was concluded with the Simla Accord of 1972 when Pakistan agreed to rename the old Ceasefire Line as the Line of Control (LoC) and India presumed, naively as it turned out, that the agreement implied its acceptance of a de facto border. Pakistan had just lost its more populous eastern wing with the 1971 war and Mrs Indira Gandhi believed she was settling the Kashmir issue on her own terms. She was mistaken.

Pakistan then began a relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons. The Kashmir issue still remained dormant and the Valley was quiet. But in the late-1970s, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and US-supported Mujahideen’s fight back with crucial support of Pakistan, things changed again. By the end of the 1980s, Pakistan had started believing it had defeated the mighty Soviets in Afghanistan with the strategy of bleeding by a thousand cuts, so why not try it with India, in Kashmir and Punjab. This is when the ongoing troubles began, helped along by Rajiv Gandhi’s unwise rigging of the 1987 Kashmir elections.

Since then, Pakistan and India have both followed a consistent policy, or what Mao would have described as talk-talk, fight-fight. Combat has been low-level and confined to the Valley. Both sides have expressed the inclination to talk on all issues including Kashmir.

The Prime Minister has changed that on Monday by invoking Balochistan and Northern Areas. The new approach is, you mess with our soft underbelly, we will mess with your most vulnerable region, whatever the geographical limitations. To that extent, India has changed the rules of the game. The ball is now in Pakistan’s court.


Also read: Why is the army in Pakistan dangerous for democracy? Answer goes back to 1947


 

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